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Italy, British resolve and the
1935-1936 Italo-Ethiopian War
Jason Davidson
1 As Italian elites prepared to attack Ethiopia in 1935 they knew that resolve mattered;
they were aware that  British willingness  to  incur costs  to  defend Ethiopia  and the
League of  Nations would have a  decisive impact  on the war.  If  the British were to
militarily oppose to Italy or even to close the Suez Canal, the Italian war effort would be
prohibitively costly and would probably fail.  Moreover, the British sent signals that
could have been interpreted as evidence of high resolve (a willingness to incur great
costs  to  defend  Ethiopia  and  the  League  of  Nations).  In  mid-September  Foreign
Secretary Samuel Hoare made an impassioned pledge that Britain would be “second to
none” in defending its League obligations. The British government also repositioned
the Home and Mediterranean fleets to be nearer to the potential clash. Some high-
ranking Italian officials interpreted these signals as evidence that Britain would incur
costs  to  defend  Ethiopia  and  the  League.  Despite  these  signals,  however,  Fascist
Dictator Benito Mussolini perceived low British resolve and rejected the final peace
proposals on September 21st. He took Italy to war with Ethiopia on October 3rd, 1935.
This  article  seeks  to  explain  why  the  Italian  government  perceived  low  British
willingness to incur costs on the eve of the Ethiopian War in 1935. 
2 The article  offers  an explanation of  varying assessments  of  resolve  (defined as  the
willingness to incur costs  for a  disputed good) that  is  rooted in neoclassical  realist
theory. I argue that careerism by key domestic actors and the nature of the defender’s
signals  can combine to  lead to  perceptions of  low resolve even if  evidence of  high
resolve  exists.  First,  those  domestic  actors  within  the  challenger’s  state,  that  are
personally committed, or “vested” in, foreign policy action against the defender are
most  likely  to  question the  defender’s  signals.  In  contrast  to  previous  scholarship,
however, I do not argue that these vested actors are blind to signals of their adversary’s
resolve –vested actors are simply more critical judges of incoming signals.1 The nature
of the signals is incredibly important. I argue that challenger governments dominated
by vested actors are only likely to perceive high resolve when defenders send clear
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(unambiguous) and costly signals. Even highly vested actors look for and perceive clear
signals, whereas they are motivated to deemphasize anything less. 
3 International  relations scholars  have long recognized the importance of  resolve (as
defined  above)  in  international  security.  In  deterrence  theory,  for  example,  a  low-
resolve defender will have much more difficulty deterring a challenger than a high-
resolve defender.2 However, scholars have yet to adequately explain the states’ varying
perceptions of adversary resolve. This is a problem because, given the nebulous nature
of resolve, states often try to signal resolve to an adversary but fail.  The history of
international security is rife with cases where incorrect assessments of resolve led to
much blood spilt that otherwise would not have been.3
 
Definitions of resolve
4 As noted above, I define resolve as the willingness to incur costs, or, as Steven Rosen
put it,  “the willingness  to  suffer”.4 The more willing a  state  is  to  incur costs  for  a
particular good, the higher its resolve. By costs, I generally mean lives lost and money
spent but costs can be anything the defender values. Rosen cites the famous quote by
North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh that “[i]n the end, the Americans will have killed
ten of us for every American soldier who died, but it is they who will tire first”.5 Resolve
differs from but is related to capabilities (i.e., the resources states use to get what they
want in international  relations).  Resolve refers  to  a  state’s  willingness to use these
capabilities. A state’s resolve is also often related to its probability of action. All things
held equal, the more willing a state is to incur costs for a contested good, the more
likely it is to act to acquire or defend that good. This is not to say that the two concepts
are synonymous. States may have a high willingness to incur costs but a low probability
of action because they expect their chances of success to improve in the future. 
 
An Alternative Explanation: Costly Signals
5 The signaling approach assumes that the defender’s signals are of primary importance
in  constituting  challenger  perceptions  of  defender  resolve.6 An initial  claim is  that
certain signals convey a high resolve message whereas others do not.7 Perhaps the most
common signals  states  send are  statements;  some directly  refer  to  a  willingness  to
incur costs others refer to the probability of action –often in the form of an “if/then”
threat statement or the state’s interest in a particular good.8 A related step states may
take is to formally commit to the defense of a threatened state.9 Military action also can
signal resolve. When states mobilize forces, move them, or place them in a vulnerable
area (so-called “trip-wire forces”) they signal resolve.10 Trip wire forces demonstrate
resolve in that they risk an initial sunk cost (lost life) that, if imposed, may require
more costs to be incurred. 
6 Thomas Schelling argued that costly signals are more likely to be heard than “cheap”
talk. The defender has to be willing to incur costs while signaling in order to make the
case  that  it  will  be  willing  to  incur  costs  to  defend  the  objective.11 James  Fearon
developed  the  argument  that  public  commitments  are  costly  because  they  entail
international and domestic audience costs if the defender later chooses not to defend
the contested good.12 Kenneth Schultz has argued that democracies are particularly
able  to  make  credible  threats  because  opposition  groups  serve  as  an  independent
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source  of  information and a  check against  bluffing.13 This  is  important  because,  as
Robert Jervis has shown, states have an incentive to bluff (i.e., to say that they have
higher resolve than is the case). If states convince others that they are more interested
in a disputed good than they truly are, they are more likely to win in a dispute.14
7 The primary problem with the costly signaling argument is that it is overly generous in
categorizing a signal as costly.  Costly signal theorists count even very vague public
statements regarding the contested good as signals of high resolve. For example, James
Fearon cites  David Lloyd George’s  “Mansion House” speech during the 1911 Agadir
crisis between France and Germany over Morocco, as an example of a costly signal.15 It
is important to recognize that in the relevant portion of the Mansion House speech
Lloyd George did not even mention Morocco or Germany, instead stating,
[…] if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved
by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries
of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests
were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I
say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a
great country like ours to endure.16
8 Under what circumstances does this statement commit Britain to use force and against
whom? Exactly, what outcome would lead to the surrender of Britain’s position? If a
clear answer to that question cannot be offered, how can the politician making it be
held accountable for backing down later? 
 
A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Failed Attempts to Signal
Resolve
9 My argument is rooted in the neoclassical realist approach to explaining foreign policy.
Neoclassical  realism agrees with the general  realist  emphasis  on the importance of
power and conflict in international politics but also uses domestic and individual-level
factors to explain the complex ways in which power and conflict are manifest in foreign
policy outcomes.17 This project is neoclassical realist because of the object of study and
the way I am studying it. In exploring how a potential challenger perceives a defender’s
willingness to incur costs, I am focusing on state perceptions of relevant power –that is,
how much power a state is willing to use in a particular context. The argument that
follows is also neoclassical realist because it integrates factors from the domestic and
international levels of analysis to explain perceptions of resolve. 
10 My argument focuses on the interaction of two factors: vested actors and clear signals. I
begin  by  noting  that  domestic  actors  have  varying  levels  of  motivation  to  process
information on adversary  resolve:  it  is  essential  to  distinguish between what  I  call
interested and vested actors. I argue that actors are primarily driven to maximize their
career opportunities. As such, not all members of a bureaucracy that stands to gain
from  war  would  favor  it,  as  prior  scholarship  has  suggested.18 This  is  because  the
individual’s  career gains from successful  challenge are not so great as  to make the
individual blind to the negative ramifications of policy failure. For example, a general
would stand to gain in career terms from a successful war. The same general, however,
would be concerned with his reputation as an analyst if his country were to be defeated
in war because he underestimated adversary resolve. While we can expect an interested
actor –one employed by a bureaucracy that may gain from successful challenge– to
view evidence of high defender resolve with skepticism, it also makes sense to expect
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that  skepticism to  have  limits  given  the  costs  of  underestimating  resolve  (i.e.,  the
devastation that can come with a lost war). 
11 Vested actors also often play a role in international crises. Vested actors are born when
an individual repeatedly advocates for a challenge to the status quo that could result in
war.19 The  advocate  for  challenge  makes  internal  appeals  to  persuade  government
colleagues  and makes  public  appeals  to  national  and international  audiences.  In  so
doing, the actor becomes vested in the aggressive policy in a fundamental sense –his or
her personal fortune becomes intertwined with the policy. A successful challenge will
entail  personal,  career success whereas the absence of challenge or failed challenge
attempt will entail personal failure. Motivated bias provides the link between domestic
actors’  preferences and perceptions of  resolve.  Research in psychology tells  us that
people dislike value trade-offs. As a result, people often ignore or discount information
that would confront them with the reality of a value trade-off.20 For example, actors
with an interest in an aggressive policy stance would be expected to discount or ignore
information of high adversary resolve, as such information would force a value trade-
off  between  the  desire  for  the  benefits  of  challenge  and  the  painful  reality  that
challenge is unlikely to succeed.21 The motivated bias trade-off discussed above is more
severe for the vested actor than it is for the merely interested actor. If the vested actor
is forced to recognize that the defender has high resolve she/he will either have to
endorse retreat from the advocated policy or face likely failure in that policy. Wallace
Thies offered a similar logic to make sense of the Johnson administration’s Vietnam
policy:
[…] Since a decision to yield in the face of coercive pressures must often be made by
the very officials who argued (often long and hard) for going ahead with whatever
action brought on the coercive pressures […] the decision to yield is one that may
be fraught with peril for the careers and at times the lives of the officials who must
make it […].22
12 Consequently, vested actors are highly critical of signs of high defender resolve and if
they dominate the challenger’s government, this means a perception of low resolve is
likely. Even these actors usually recognize, however, that an attempt at challenge that
ends in a disastrous national defeat is worse for them than policy retreat. Vested actors
are highly critical; they are rarely blind. To illustrate: British Prime Minister Anthony
Eden was a leading advocate, in public and private, for the use of force against Egypt in
1956. He did alter his initial perception of low American resolve, however, when the
U.S.  took  action  at  the  International  Monetary  Fund  that  put  severe  pressure  on
Britain, making American resolve clear.23 Because vested actors have a motivation for
being critical we expect only the clearest signals of defender resolve to get through to
them. 
13 The more ambiguous the signal is, the less likely it is to lead to a perception of high
resolve.24 As Snyder and Diesing put it “[m]aximum explicitness and clarity in threats
tends to produce maximum credibility.”25 Clarity in public statements entails that the
defender specify the exact nature of the steps it will take (i.e., the costs it is willing to
incur) if the challenger violates the status quo. Defenders act with clarity when costly
action can only be interpreted as a contribution to the defense of the disputed good;
ambiguous action can be interpreted in ways that  have nothing to do with resolve
signaling. 
14 Defenders may have incentives to be less than clear. The more ambiguous a signal is the
more able government officials are to evade the costs associated with having one’s bluff
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called.26 As Thomas Schelling wrote “[t]o say one may act is to say that one may not,
and to say this is to confess that one has kept the power of decision […].”27 Clear signals
of  high  resolve  always  entail  costs  to  a  sender  if  it  backs  down.  It  is  reasonable,
moreover,  for  skeptical  challengers  to  see  ambiguous  signals  as  indicators  of  low
resolve. If the defender was willing to incur costs, the challenger reasons, it would have
sent a clear signal.28 In sum, a defender is most likely to convince a challenger of high
resolve when it makes a public statement that unambiguously commits it to incur costs
to  defend  the  contested  good  or  takes  action  that  can  only  be  interpreted  as
contributing to the defense of that good. 
15 A combination of the vested-actor argument and the clear-signal argument provides an
explanation of failed attempts to signal resolve (see Table 1). Vested actors are the most
critical  interpreters  of  adversary  signals.  If  vested  actors  dominate  the  domestic
decision making process, the state is unlikely to perceive high resolve in the absence of
clear  signals.  If,  however,  the  defender  sends  clear  signals  of  high  resolve,  even
governments  dominated  by  vested  actors  are  expected  to  perceive  high  resolve.  If
interested actors dominate, public ambiguous signals should be sufficient to generate
challenger  perceptions  of  high  resolve.  In  other  words,  the  signaling  threshold  is
higher for vested actors than interested ones.
 
Table 1. Vested Actors, Clear Signals, and Perceptions of Defender Resolve
 Vested Actors Interested Actors
Clear High High
Public but Ambiguous Low High
Neither Low Low
 
Methods and Case Selection
16 In this case study I will use congruence procedure and process tracing methods.29 My
aim in using both of these methods will be to assess the fit of the explanations outlined
above to this case study as a theory-building exercise and an initial evaluation of the
arguments.30 This  case  is  remarkable  because  Mussolini,  at  the  helm of  the  Italian
government,  perceived  low resolve  despite  British  signals  that  many  interpreted  as
indicating high resolve. There is also a detailed empirical record of British signaling
and  Italian  elite  perceptions  as  recorded  by  multiple  elites  within  the  British  and
Italian governments in informal (e.g., diaries and memoirs) and formal (e.g., dispatches
reprinted in published primary source collections) manifestations.31 Finally, in this case
an alternative theory provides contradictory claims.32 The audience costs theory clearly
predicts perceptions of high resolve in this case as public signals were sent and the
British government was a democracy. 
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Explaining Italian Perceptions of British Resolve on
Ethiopia in 1935
17 In this case study resolve refers to a British willingness to incur the costs that a closure
of the Suez Canal or military action against Italy would have entailed.33 British resolve
was crucial  to Italian policy in this  case.  First,  Italian elites recognized that British
military  intervention  would  have  devastating  military  consequences  on  Italy’s  war
effort.34 In  January  1935,  Domenico  Cavagnari,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Italian  Navy,
suggested that prior to the conflict Mussolini should “believe himself able to exclude
the step, that would have grave consequences, of the closure of the Suez Canal, relative
to the passage of our armed forces.”35 Second, perceptions of low British resolve were
seen as a necessary prerequisite for Italian attack.36 As high-ranking Italian diplomat,
Raffaele  Guariglia  explained  that  it  was  “[i]mpossible  to  do  it  against  France  and
Britain, indispensable to do it in agreement with them.”37
18 The following narrative reveals that while the British sent some signals of moderate to
high  resolve  from  December  1934  to  September  1935,  none  were  costly.  In  mid-
September 1935 the British sent two costly signals of high resolve and most Italian
elites began to perceive high British resolve. Mussolini continued to perceive British
resolve as low, however, and ultimately chose to refuse the final peace proposals in late
September. Analysis of the alternative explanations follows the narrative.
 
From Walwal to Stresa
19 On December 5th, 1934, fighting erupted between an Ethiopian force camped at Walwal
and Italian troops that occupied the area, claiming it was a part of Italian Somaliland.38
Italy claimed its  forces had been attacked but its  initial  demands on Ethiopia were
limited; they included a formal Ethiopian apology, recognition of Italy’s right to occupy
Walwal,  and  financial  compensation.39 The  British  and  French  were  successful  in
getting Ethiopia to pursue the dispute through bilateral arbitration - not the League of
Nations as Ethiopia preferred.40 Britain, it seemed, did not want to damage the League
by exposing it  to a dispute that the League was not capable of resolving.41 Britain’s
initial action hardly signaled high resolve. 
20 Italian decision makers appear to have initially expected a low British willingness to
incur costs to defend Ethiopia.42 Past British agreements with Italy on Ethiopia seemed
to signal a lack of British interests and in the eyes of some a free hand for Italy.43 In an
important directive to General Pietro Badoglio,  chief of the Italian general staff,  on
December 30th, 1934, Mussolini said that Italy need not worry about Britain or France
intervening as long as their interests were recognized.44 Undersecretary of the Italian
Foreign  Ministry  Fulvio  Suvich  recognized  British  interests  in  the  League  and  the
region but also did not predict Britain would take military action.45 In late January,
Italy’s government, still perceiving low British resolve, extended an informal invitation
for  future  talks  with  Britain  on  East  Africa.46 Britain’s  failure  to  respond  to  this
initiative led some in Italy to believe London was uninterested in Italian action against
Ethiopia.47 
21 Italian preparations for war in Ethiopia began in the summer of 1934.48 The British
responded to Italy’s  preparations with mild protest,  seemingly convinced by Italian
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assertions that the build-up was intended to defend Italian colonies from Ethiopia.49 In
his  aforementioned  directive  to  Badoglio,  Mussolini  made  it  clear  that  Italy  would
henceforth look to resolve the Ethiopian problem by force.50 Within a month the Italian
representative at the League,  Pompeo Aloisi,  referred to Mussolini’s  decision to use
force  as  “irrevocable.”51 On  February 11 th,  Mussolini  ordered  general  mobilization,
which he justified by the Ethiopian menace and the weakness of Italian forces in the
region.52 While the British did not know about the Badoglio directive, they did know
about the mobilization.53 Robert Vansittart, Britain’s Permanent Under-Secretary for
Foreign  Affairs,  warned  Ambassador  Grandi  on  February 27th that  war  in  Ethiopia
would be met with hostility from the British public and the unity of Britain, France, and
Italy would be threatened.54 This was the first signal that Britain might be willing to
incur costs in defense of the League and Ethiopia, but as it was private it cannot be
considered costly. 
22 The  Stresa  conference  of  April  11-14,  1935,  was  ostensibly  designed  to  promote
cooperation by Italy, France, and Britain against rising German threat. However, the
Ethiopian  crisis  did  loom  in  the  background.  While  Grandi  convinced  the  British
Foreign Office  to  send a  North African specialist  to  Stresa,  the  British  government
prohibited him from discussing major issues of  the Italo-Ethiopian conflict.55 In the
informal  conversations  that  resulted  the  British  expert  heard  that  Italy  could  not
exclude the use of force as a means to resolve the dispute.56 The British representative
replied that Italy could not expect cooperation from Britain and that such a policy
“might well react adversely upon Anglo-Italian relations.”57 Mussolini claimed a victory
in that the final declaration, which noted that the three countries would work together
to preserve the peace, only referred to Europe.58 Britain did not seem to signal a high
willingness to incur costs at Stresa; a dispatch from a leading Italian diplomat at Stresa
stated that “Great Britain does not appear disposed at this point to assume a precise
attitude.”59
 
From Stresa to the Three-Power Talks
23 The day after the Stresa conference ended, Ethiopia tried, yet again, to get the League
to formally address its dispute with Italy. The British government used the opportunity
to demand that both sides be prepared to begin arbitration by May.60 This seemingly
minor diplomatic move was important as the first public British effort in support for
Ethiopia and a non-violent solution to the dispute. Some among Italy’s elite took the
April 15th League démarche as a sign of British resolve.61 In this context, Guariglia and
Grandi led a charge to probe the British in an effort to clarify London’s position.62 
24 In meeting with Grandi,  Vansittart  began by recognizing that military preparations
underway meant that “Italy wants to put her hand on Abyssinia”. He also noted that
“English public opinion would be decidedly against Italy”; and that the government
would have to listen to the public.63 Vansittart went on to stress the importance of the
League of Nations in keeping Britain committed to Western Europe and stated that the
government  would  “[…]  do  everything  to  demonstrate  the  efficacy  of  the  Genevan
institution to the restive British opinion in the case of an Italo-Ethiopian conflict.”64
The British offered similar signals when Grandi met with Vansittart and Simon in early
May.65 In the wake of these two probes Mussolini remained unconvinced of high British
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resolve.  He  claimed that  if  forced to  make a  choice  between Italy  and the  League,
Britain would choose Italy.66
25 As Italian elites perceived low British resolve, they began making clear that Italy would
use  force  in  Ethiopia.67 The  amount  of  Italian  troops  and materiel  in  Ethiopia  also
allowed Italian diplomats to make the case that Italy could not concede now because
Italian prestige would suffer.68 Moreover, in the wake of British pressure at the League,
Mussolini  began  to  commit  himself  publicly  to  a  course  of  conflict.  In  a  May 14th
declaration to  the Italian Senate,  he  warned that  “[…] we will  send all  the  soldiers
necessary and no one should assume the intolerable arbitrary power to interject with
regard to the character and the quantity of our precautionary measures.”69 Mussolini
was becoming publicly committed to the use of force against Ethiopia. 
26 About this time, Britain’s private warnings began to entail harsher language. On
May 21th, Eric Drummond, Britain’s Ambassador to Rome, told Mussolini privately that
an Italian war on Ethiopia “might have the gravest results on the League and on the
relations between our two countries and on security.”70 As the tension mounted, on
May 25th,  the British-led  League’s  Council  passed  resolutions  forcing  the  parties  to
appoint a tie-breaking fifth arbitrator and mandating that the Council would take up
the dispute if the parties failed to address it by August 25th.71 Undeterred, Mussolini
approved mobilization  of  three  additional  divisions  at  the  end of  May.72 When the
Italian dictator rejected a June peace offer that Anthony Eden, Lord Privy Seal,  had
personally delivered to Rome, Eden offered a similarly worded warning.73 Some Italian
elites  interpreted  British  action  as  hostility  toward  Italy  rooted  in  British  colonial
interests.74 
27 On June 18, the British foreign office received the secret report of a special commission,
tasked  with  evaluating  the  country’s  interests  in  Ethiopia.75 The  “Maffey  Report”
argued that British interests in Ethiopia did not necessitate military action to preserve
the status quo but the authors admitted that they had not considered related British
interests, such as the integrity of the League, in making their assessment.76 The Italian
government  acquired  a  copy  of  the  report  soon  after  its  release.77 On  June 27,  the
results of the British Peace Ballot, an unofficial national plebiscite on the League of
Nations,  became available.  Of  those  voting  94% approved of  non-military  measures
against  an  aggressor  violating  the  League’s  covenant  and  59%  supported  military
sanctions for a violator.78
28 Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare’s “double policy,” which sought a negotiated solution
while  supporting  collective  action,  produced  mixed  Italian  perceptions  of  British
resolve.79 On July 6th, Mussolini proclaimed to Italian troops that “[…] we are involved
in a struggle of decisive importance and that we are immovably decided to follow it
through  to  the  end.”80 With  statements  like  this  one  the  Duce was  becoming
increasingly vested in an attack on Ethiopia and he would be increasingly resistant to
signals  of  high  British  resolve.  League  of  Nations  ambassador  Aloisi  was  more
pessimistic.  Reflecting on Eden’s  June mission to Rome,  he commented that  Britain
“puts itself on the path of war.”81 On July 11th, Hoare went so far as to publicly refute
rumors  that  Britain  and  France  were  discussing  a  blockade  of  Italy.82 Italian  elites
breathed a sigh of relief.83 On July 20th, Aloisi wrote that Mussolini was “more firm than
ever in the objectives that he proposes to achieve in Abyssinia.”84 The Italian dictator
continued to pledge himself publicly to action. On the same day in an interview with
the French paper Echo de Paris, Mussolini replied to a question about public support for
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his aims in Ethiopia that “[a]lmost the whole nation has grasped that which I want and
why I want it. She [the nation] has an effort to make, after which she will have her
place in the world.”85
29 In the second half of July France and Britain issued warnings to Italy, noting Italian
commitments and the importance of the League for French and British security.86 On
July 29th,  the  Foreign  Office  sent  a  memo  that  outlined  its  interests  in  opposing
Mussolini to Laval, who passed it along to the Italians.87 The next day, Aloisi wrote of
the memo “[i]t completely clarifies the intention of the English cabinet in our regard.
London, which treats us like we are crazy, is anxious for the League of Nations, for its
colonial empire and will prevent us from waging war at all costs.”88 Aloisi failed to note,
however, that the British memo made no mention of what Britain should actually do if
Italy attacked Ethiopia. Mussolini responded to the British memo by committing even
more firmly to war. On July 31th, the Duce used the newspaper Il Popolo d’Italia to commit
his regime; he proclaimed that “[t]he solution of the problem must be total. […] The
problem admits of only one solution –with Geneva, without Geneva, against Geneva.”89
As he vested himself and his regime in the future war he would be reluctant to accept
all but the clearest evidence that the war would fail due to British resistance. 
 
From the Tripartite Talks to War
30 Some decision makers in Italy became concerned that British resolve was higher than
had been previously thought.90 In  talks  with Grandi,  Vansittart  emphasized that  an
Italian attack on Ethiopia would deal the League a “mortal blow.”91 Grandi continued to
predict  that  Britain’s  bite  would  be  less  savage  than  its  bark.92 Mussolini,  while
continuing to make bold statements, ordered chief of staff Badoglio to study how Italy
would cope with a military clash with Britain on August 9th.93 Badoglio’s study reported
on August 14th that Italy would be at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis Britain, referring
to  Italy’s  situation  as  “by  far  the  most  difficult  that  our  country  has  ever  passed
through.”94 The next day Grandi advised Mussolini to “tirare diritto” (continue ahead):
Grandi  expected  Britain  would  take  no  military  action  against  Italy  as  the  British
military had recently reported to its  cabinet that they could not guarantee success
against  Italy.95 The  British  government  became  concerned  with  avoiding  an  Italian
attack on the British fleet, referred to as a “mad-dog” act.96 In the last week of August,
Grandi reported that the British cabinet had decided to defend the League but only
through collective action and in full cooperation with the French, which meant it was
unlikely to occur.97 
31 Other Italian elites were increasingly convinced that British resolve was higher than
Mussolini believed. On August 20th, a group of senators along with Pietro Badoglio met
to discuss approaching Italy’s king, Victor Emmanuel II, to restrain Mussolini’s rush to
war.98 Mussolini’s behavior demonstrates that he was not impervious to perceptions of
growing British resolve. The next day Mussolini wrote to General De Bono, telling him
that in the case of “grave complications” with Britain he would receive special orders.99
At  the  same time Mussolini  continued  to  publicly  commit  himself  to  action.  In  an
August 28th speech to Italian troops, he condemned “absurd and provocative” talk of
sanctions and stated defiantly that Italy would “take the nation’s armed forces to the
highest possible level.”100 Badoglio wrote to Mussolini in early September, warning of
the British navy’s “crushing superiority” over Italy’s fleet and pleading with him to
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reconsider.101 On September 5 th,  Mussolini instructed Grandi to convince the Foreign
Office that Italy would work to avoid a clash with Britain.102 
32 Shortly  thereafter,  two  British  moves  led  many  Italian  elites  to  reassess  their
perceptions  of  British  resolve.103 On  September 11 th,  Samuel  Hoare,  addressing  the
League of Nations, passionately proclaimed the importance of the League and promised
that Britain would be “second to none” in fulfilling its commitment.104 Most –in Italy
and in the rest of the international community– interpreted Hoare’s public speech as a
strong sign of British resolve.105 Those who held this interpretation failed to note that
Hoare pledged that Britain would support action led by others. At about the same time
it became public knowledge that Britain had moved its Mediterranean fleet from Malta
to Alexandria.106 While the British may have been motivated by a desire to deter attack
on Ethiopia it was as plausible that they sought to deter a “mad-dog” Italian attack on
Britain’s Mediterranean fleet.107 On September 14th, Italian elites became aware that the
British representative in Addis Ababa had privately pledged that Britain would prevent
Italian  action  against  Ethiopia.108 According  to  historian  George  Baer,  these  events
“gave rise to the greatest concern Italian officials had felt so far.”109 This sentiment
among Italian officials contrasted with Mussolini’s steady stream of threats and claims
that  war  was  inevitable.110 In  an  interview  with  the  French  journal  Matin on
September 15th the Fascist dictator emphatically stated that 
“[t]his is not a game of poker […]. [W]e shall go straight ahead.”111 Mussolini seemed to
prefer the low resolve interpretation of these signals as neither of them definitively
committed Britain to Ethiopia’s defense.112 
33 In  this  climate,  in  which  many  Italians  perceived  high  British  resolve,  a  special
committee of the League proposed a peace plan in which the League would oversee
reform  of  Ethiopia  and  France  and  Britain  would  work  for  territorial  adjustments
between Ethiopia and Italy.113 In the next few days, Grandi reported from London that
Britain might respond to an Italian attack with force and Aloisi  urged Mussolini  to
accept the proposals, which he believed could be modified to achieve Italy’s aims.114
Under  this  pressure  Mussolini  proposed  on  September 18th that  Britain  and  France
promise not to apply military sanctions in return for a promise that Italy would not
attack the British navy and that it would withdraw two divisions in Libya.115 The Duce
was clearly probing for indicators of resolve 
–the British realized this  was the case and hoped to keep Mussolini  guessing.116 On
September 20th, Drummond reported to Mussolini that Britain was making additional
naval  reinforcements  and  had  redeployed  a  portion  of the  home  fleet  to  the
Mediterranean.117 Mussolini ignored his advisors and rejected the final peace proposal
in the early hours of September 21th.118 Italian troops invaded Ethiopia on October 3rd,
1935.119 Mussolini  provided  himself  with  an  important  escape  hatch  if  his  initial
assessment was wrong. Italy’s war plan entailed an initial advance –of a few hundred
miles– and then a pause to “await events on the international plane.”120 
 
Explanations of Italian Perceptions
34 The signaling explanation outlined above expected costly signals to lead to perceptions
of high resolve. A few public signals did lead many Italian policymakers to adjust their
perceptions of British resolve. Hoare’s September 11th speech and the mid-September
fleet movements caused many Italian policymakers to fear British intervention. The
impact of these two signals, one a public speech with high domestic and international
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audience costs and the other a public form of military action provides support for the
argument that costly signals matter more than those made in private. The British had
been sending private signals expressing their concern with a looming Italo-Ethiopian
war all summer with no effect. There is a significant problem with the costly signals
explanation,  however.  Despite  the  costly  September  signals  and  the  perceptions  of
many elites that resolve was high, Mussolini continued to perceive Britain as having
low resolve and he rejected the final League proposal on September 2th. Another major
problem with this explanation is that it cannot explain why Mussolini perceived the
September signals differently than other Italian officials, who urged him to accept the
final proposal. Why did they, having seen the same signals, perceive them differently? 
 
Table 2. Vested Actors, Clear Signals, and the Italo-Ethiopian War














35 The  vested  actors  and  clear  signals  explanation  predicts  the  correct outcome  and
makes sense of the causal process that led to it (see Table 2). A thorough explanation of
this case needs to explain why Mussolini did not perceive the September signals as
indicators  of  high  resolve  while  others  did.  Mussolini  repeatedly  and  publicly
committed himself and his regime to military action against Ethiopia. In fact, he had far
more frequently and vehemently spoken in favor of action than any other government
official in public or private. As early as February 1935, the Italian representative to the
League of Nations, Pompeo Aloisi, referred to Mussolini’s decision to use force as one
that “implicates the future of the regime.”121 For the Duce to have accepted a negotiated
settlement because Italy faced a high British willingness to incur costs would have been
a major blow to his career.122 In reporting on the Italian dictator’s apparent sang froid in
the face of the September signals, British ambassador Drummond noted that “Signor
Mussolini realises that his own position is at stake in an adventure which can only be
justified by success.”123 Because he was so personally vested in the conflict,  it  made
good sense for the Duce to  view signals  of  British resolve with extreme skepticism.
Anything other than a clear public signal of resolve would not convince him that the
British were willing to incur costs to defend Ethiopia and the League.
36 Why was Mussolini not convinced by the Hoare speech and the fleet movement? The
September  signals  were  public  and  costly  but  not  sufficiently  clear  to  lead  to
perceptions of high resolve. British signals were ultimately evaluated relative to the
signals that might have been sent. If the British had a high willingness to incur costs to
defend Ethiopia and the League, it was reasonable to ask, why did they not publicly and
explicitly threaten military action if Italy attacked Ethiopia? Both the mid-September
signals could be interpreted as half measures and it seems that Mussolini interpreted
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them this way. In fact, on two occasions in August Grandi commented on the absence of
any direct reference to “real and true” sanctions and that many in Britain urged the
government to “do something” without reference to explicitly what it should do.124 On
September 3rd, Grandi noted to Hoare that “amidst the public clamour for sanctions in
the British press and on the British platform, the British Foreign Secretary had never so
much  as  mentioned  the  dangerous  word.”125 Because  he  was  vested  in  using  force
against Ethiopia Mussolini was motivated to look skeptically at the September signals
and to see them as signs of low British resolve. 
 
Conclusion
37 This article has offered a novel explanation of varying perceptions of resolve. It argued
that  we  must  look  at  vested  actors  and  clear  signals  to  make  sense  of  why  states
sometimes perceive others’ resolve as high. First, the article made the case that actors
who are vested –through repeated public advocacy– in a particular policy path will be
especially skeptical of signals of adversary resolve as they seek to avoid value trade-
offs.  Second,  the  article  argued that  the  more ambiguity  that  is  present  in  resolve
signals, the less likely states are to perceive others’ resolve as high. The article pointed
out  that  vested  actors  are  especially  likely  to  be  skeptical  of  ambiguous  signals.  It
differed  from  previous  scholarship,  however,  in  arguing  that  vested  actors  can  be
convinced of high adversary resolve by clear and costly signals. 
38 The  article  used  this  theoretical  approach  to  explain  Italian  perceptions  of  British
resolve on the eve of Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. In September 1935, the British
government went from mostly private warnings to two noteworthy public signals: they
moved a portion of their home fleet to the Mediterranean and Secretary Hoare pledged
that Britain would be “second to none” in defending its League commitment. Many
Italian officials  reacted to  these  signals  by  upgrading their  view of  British  resolve.
Benito Mussolini did not. The article concludes that because Mussolini was so vested in
war with Ethiopia he was motivated to note ambiguity in the signals that other Italian
officials overlooked. 
39 Some policy recommendations flow from the article’s conclusions. States seeking to
convince  others  of  their  resolve  should  first  note  whether  their  adversary’s
government contains powerful individuals who are vested in action. If not, public but
somewhat ambiguous signals should result in perceptions of high resolve. If, however,
the  adversary  contains  vested  actors,  only  unambiguous  signals  will  suffice.  When
faced with vested actors, signaling states are forced to make their willingness to incur
costs known. 
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ABSTRACTS
This article offers an explanation of varying perceptions of resolve - the willingness to incur
costs in order to reach a contested good. The article argues that domestic actors who publicly
and personally invest themselves in policy action are likely to view signals of high adversary
resolve more critically than those who do not. Variance in signals is also important. Skeptical
“vested”  actors  view  even  public  signals  as  indicators  of  low  resolve  if  the  signals  contain
ambiguity. If “vested” actors dominate the challenger’s government, only clear and costly signals
are likely to lead the challenger to perceive high defender resolve. I use this approach to explain
Italian perceptions of British resolve on the eve of the 1935-36 Italo-Ethiopian War. While many
Italian officials came to see British resolve as high, Benito Mussolini was motivated to see the
ambiguity in British signals. 
Cet article propose une analyse de la perception variable de la résolution (l’attitude qui permet
de prendre en compte des coûts pour obtenir un bien contesté). L’article soutient que les acteurs
nationaux qui s’investissent personnellement et de façon publique dans l’action politique sont
susceptibles  de  sous-interpréter  les  signaux  provenant  de  compétiteurs  engagés  dans  une
épreuve de force. La variation de ces signaux constitue également un paramètre important. Des
acteurs sceptiques ne prennent pas aux sérieux des messages, même publics, s’ils contiennent des
ambiguïtés. Si des acteurs fortement motivés dominent le gouvernement du compétiteur, alors
seulement des signaux clairs et forts (en termes de coûts) de la part du défenseur peuvent
amener le compétiteur à percevoir le caractère résolu du défendeur. C’est ce schéma interprétatif
que  nous  utilisons  pour  expliquer  les  perceptions  italiennes  de  l’attitude  résolue  des
Britanniques  au  seuil  de  la  guerre  italo-éthiopienne  de  1935-1936.  Alors  que  de  nombreux
officiels italiens percevaient la détermination des Britanniques,  Benito Mussolini continuait à
insister sur l’ambiguïté des signaux de leur part. 
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